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Abstract
This paper centers upon two potentially transformative Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) on the DPRK’s northwestern frontier – 
Hwanggumpyeong and Wihwa Islands. As part of a strategy for 
development along North Korea’s northern rim put in place by 
Kim Jong-il in the two years prior to his death (and following the 
visit of Wen Jiabao to the DPRK in October 2009), the islands 
fell under the management of Jang Song-taek. When Jang was 
abruptly purged, the role of the economic zones came into 
question: Would the DPRK continue the development of the 
zones, which was already moving quite slowly? Why did North 
Korea start a number of new SEZs along the frontier with China 
just prior to Jang’s purge, apparently without coordinating with 
Beijing? What does this unilateral recalibration by North Korea 
of its own use and geographical location of SEZs with China say 
with respect to internal debates over “reform and opening up” 
in Pyongyang? Using an array of non-English sources with a 
focus on Hwanggumpyeong and Wihwa Islands, this paper will 
reveal how China appears to be going along with North Korea’s 
new SEZ strategy in the border region in a reluctant bid to 
remain engaged and at the forefront of non-Korean investment 
in the DPRK.
Key words: Jang Song-taek, Hwanggumpyeong Island, Wihwa 
Island, Special Economic Zones, Sino-North Korean trade, Yalu 
River development, purges and economic strategy
Introduction
What are the prospects for broader Chinese-North Korean 
cooperation in the shared border region? The execution of Jang 
Song-taek on December 13, 2013 provided strong support for a 
pessimistic view of the future, and clearly opened up a new rift 
in bilateral relations.1 With no less an implement than Jang’s very 
execution indictment, the North Korean state brought specific 
grievances with China to the fore, particularly dissatisfaction 
with Jang’s handling of the SEZ relationships with China.2 Some 
Chinese experts forecast that Jang’s dispatch forebode nothing 
less than a wholesale renegotiation of the SEZs.3 The accusation 
document for Jang Song-taek was surely “a messy mishmash…
reveal[ing] multiple voices,” and it is hard to believe that the 
North Korean state was in some way not intending to use Jang’s 
death to, among other things, send a message to Beijing that roles 
would be changing and that the SEZ elements would be revised 
if not scrapped altogether.4 In the aftermath of the purge, some 
analysts and media outlets noted that Jang’s centrality to the SEZ 
projects meant that North Korea was very likely also calling the 
basic elements of the SEZ agreements into question; i.e., using 
Jang’s death to possibly get out of its prior agreements.5
While the immediate aftermath of the purges necessitated 
careful discussion in the Chinese press of the implications, it 
did not take long for some frustration to emerge. Zhang Liangui, 
professor at the Central Party School in Beijing, bluntly noted 
that Jang’s death had been used precisely by North Korea to 
potentially discredit the entire SEZ project:
In conducting economic cooperation with China, we 
noticed that it was Jang Sung-taek who came forward to 
set up last year’s agreement with China to develop the 
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two islands of Hwanggumpyeong and Wihwa. In terms of 
China’s economic cooperation with North Korea, although 
Jang was involved in a lot of it, many of the really important 
decisions were not ones that he alone could have made – 
for example, deciding for how many years to rent out ports. 
Obviously this wasn’t a case of whatever Jang said went, 
as this involved issues of national sovereignty and so on. 
But now that Jang has been gotten rid of, he is said to have 
been responsible for all of these things.6
Jang was indeed the point person for North Korea, but his Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) interlocutors had made sure to at least 
spread nominal power widely – the steering committees for the 
zones were large, and the institutionalization of slogans about 
tending to the relationship “from generation to generation” 
were, in a sense, a way of depersonalizing the ties so that political 
shocks could be endured. It was in part the North Korean refusal 
to adhere to this principle that the death of Jang Song-taek and 
its aftermath portended poorly for the mutual development of 
Special Economic Zones along the frontier.
State censorship in China has allowed such views out only 
sporadically, but negative prospectuses abounded.7 As one 
informant told me in Yanji, North Korea had been “extremely 
indecisive in following through (朝鲜的不确定性还是很大)” on 
its economic agreements with China, but Jang had been “a bridge” 
between the two states, and self-evidently an economic leader in 
his own right. Jang’s purge, he continued, created a new “obstacle 
(障礙)” for relations with China. Not only that, he stated, it isn’t 
simply that Jang is gone, the locating of new interlocutors on the 
DPRK side takes time (慢慢搭配), and so the recovery from Jang’s 
removal can hardly be expected to be instantaneous.8
Setting aside for a moment the question of Kim Jong-un’s (or, if 
one prefers, his court’s) own interest and impetus in developing 
the Hwanggumpyeong and Wihwa SEZs, and the Kim family 
viewpoint on the Korean northwest, there is no sense in 
downplaying the meaning of Jang’s purge and death: Even if it 
was not “a total reset of the relationship” with China, the event 
was a political earthquake which by definition threw a number of 
working hypotheses into immediate question.9 One journalist in 
Seoul called it “a violent cocktail of Stalinist realpolitik” which put 
Chinese investment on the back burner.10  The stern rhetoric about 
a thwarted coup in Pyongyang, and the anti-Chinese elements in 
the indictment for Jang, would appear to indicate the need for 
some level of alarm in Beijing. Jang, after all, had been not just 
an interlocutor for Beijing on economic issues, but was the co-
chairman of the two countries’ biggest joint Special Economic 
Zone projects, at the mouth of the Yalu River: Hwanggumpyeong 
and Wihwa (황금평 & 위화도/黄金坪岛 & 威化岛).
To be clear, we are certainly not witnessing the utter implosion 
of the Sino-North Korean trade relationship, nor are we likely to 
see the death of the DPRK’s moves to set up SEZs on the northern 
frontier. But we are seeing North Korea shift its focus away 
from the previously-agreed zones near Sinuiju and into smaller, 
different SEZs along the Chinese-North Korean border, doing so 
with what appears to be minimal consultation with Beijing. Jang 
Song-taek provides an interesting connection with the SEZs and 
with China-North Korea relations, and his execution provides 
interesting points and considerations when looking at the shift by 
North Korea away from these two SEZs and in their new approach 
to relations with China. Use of Chinese sources, combined with 
evidence garnered from fieldwork in the Sino-Korean border 
region, will assist in illuminating the argument and narrative.
Confusion Over North Pyongan Economic Zones
On November 21, 2013, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) 
made an announcement: Via a decree by the Presidium of the 
Supreme People’s Assembly, “the DPRK decided to set up a special 
economic zone in some part of Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province 
[in which] the sovereignty of the DPRK will be exercised.”11 In 
a separate news release, the KCNA revealed a reorganization of 
the area around Sinuiju. Under the new scheme, “some part of 
Ojok-ri, Uiju County, North Pyongan Province will come under 
the jurisdiction of Ryongun-ri, [which] will belong to Sinuiju 
and be called North Pyongan Provincial Amnokgang economic 
development zone [압록강경제개발구].”12 The new zone was 
simultaneously announced with new SEZ sites in Chongjin, 
Nampo, and Hamhung, and others along the Korean-Chinese 
frontier in Manpo, Hyesan, and Onsong.13
“But we are seeing North Korea shift its 
focus away from the previously-agreed 
zones near Sinuiju and into smaller, 
different SEZs along the Chinese-North 
Korean border, doing so with what appears 
to be minimal consultation with Beijing.”
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This announcement was incongruous for several reasons. The 
new zones near Sinuiju would be just across the river from 
China, but not near the Hwanggumpyeong Island zone that the 
PRC had spent the last four years working with North Korea to 
build and promote. Speculation about the new SEZ strategy 
among Western analysts was quickly undercut by focusing on 
the Jang Song-taek purge, which happened just over two weeks 
later. One could tender the hypothesis that the divergence over 
the SEZ question was a reflection over “policy disputes gone 
wild” in the center, in Pyongyang, and that Jang’s excessively 
“pro-China” steps were now in the process of being undercut by 
rivals within the regime.14 As would be made clear in his death 
warrant, Jang’s fronting of economic cooperation with Chinese 
partners would be made part of his downfall, rendering not just 
Rason, but the fate of the Hwanggumpyeong and Wiwha Island 
SEZs ambiguous. Since Jang’s death, the apparent embrace of 
the new economic development zones by a Hong Kong firm and 
a new “Committee for Economic Development” in Pyongyang 
indicates that North Korea seems eager to move away from the 
models which Jang had helped to implement.15 However, even 
while Jang was alive and unchallenged publicly, the SEZs were 
never a particularly sure bet.
This paper will show how, since their very inception, these 
SEZs have been subject to varying degrees of agreement and 
discord between the two countries concerned, note several of 
the drawbacks of the very basis of the idea for the zones, and 
investigate North Korean tactics and Chinese responses.
A Brief History of the Hwanggumpyeong and  
Wihwa SEZs
At the extreme northeastern end of the Korean-Chinese frontier, 
the Rajin-Sonbong (Rason) Special Economic Zone has, relatively 
speaking, done very well in comparison with its counterpart 
spaces along the border. In spite of Jang Song-taek’s involvement 
(as described again in his execution document), Chinese 
intercourse through the zone has continued there. Jang’s death 
slowed but did not halt Chinese investment in Rason, whose 
unique location and older vintage (it was set up in 1991 during 
the momentary fever for the Greater Tumen Initiative) have left 
it less vulnerable to political shocks. Rason is also geographically 
far removed from the population centers of North Korea, making 
its development and expansion less “dangerous” from a cultural 
liberalization point of view.
The Sinuiju SEZs, in other words, are both newer and potentially 
far more important than their counterpart at Rason. Sinuiju 
is already a major city in its own right, and some 80 percent 
of bilateral trade flows through the Sinuiju-Dandong hub. If 
geography is destiny, then the North Pyongan border region with 
China’s Liaoning province ought to be the most dynamic area of 
commercial exchange between the two countries.16
Kim Jong-il, not having travelled to China since an uncomfortable 
trip in 1983 to confirm his position as successor, returned to the 
PRC in 2000 and 2001. The following year, he gave his assent to 
the setting up of a Sinuiju Special Economic Zone along the border 
with China’s Dandong, which at the time was a somewhat sleepy 
if steadily growing regional Chinese city with a history of ties 
to the DRPK. The efforts failed when the Chinese businessman 
tapped to lead the zone as a kind of extraterritorial governor was 
arrested in Shenyang for tax evasion, and the project was not 
returned to for the next seven years.17
The current SEZs on Hwanggumpyeong and Wihwa Islands are 
rooted in agreements made during the tumultuous year of 2009. 
That year witnessed the physical decline of Kim Jong-il, a DPRK 
nuclear test in May, a summer full of succession propaganda and 
preparation (Kim Jong-un was as yet unseen in public), and the 
large economic package brought by PRC Premier Wen Jiabao 
on his trip to Pyongyang in October 2009. Wen’s largesse was 
thought to serve China’s desire for a smooth succession, and 
facilitated by poor inter-Korean relations as well sinking DPRK-
Japan relations. In 2009, Jang Song-taek hardly played the leading 
role in coordinating these policies with China, but, having been 
appointed to the National Defense Commission in April 2009 and 
making public appearances that summer, his stock was rising 
globally and he was cited as a potential regent figure who might 
guide North Korea forward toward a more reformist path.18
No sooner had the PRC and DPRK agreed upon moving this major 
project forward than, again rather unexpectedly, North Korea 
sought to radically undercut the power of local and “middle-class” 
traders via a currency reform.19 The Chinese response to this step 
was not in the least supportive, and the unsightly chaos in Sinuiju 
that followed on the heels of the 2009 agreement on the SEZs 
could not be regarded as anything but negative.20 So stinging 
were memories of the currency reform that four years later, Jang 
was later blamed for it in his execution document, being called a 
“wirepuller” who had “recklessly issue[d] hundreds of billions of 
won in 2009, sparking off serious economic chaos and disturbing 
the people’s mind-set.”21
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Local authorities in Dandong, armed with much central 
government largesse, began creating “facts on the ground” in and 
around the city, building an entirely new suburb (the Xinchengqu, 
or “New City District”) at the end of a bridge construction site that 
would ultimately reach the DPRK. Dai Yulin (戴玉林), CCP Party 
Secretary in Dandong, is an important player, with a background 
as vice mayor to the gregarious Bo Xilai. Dai was appointed to the 
post in Dandong in August 2010, as plans began to materialize 
for accelerated ties with North Korea, re-upped for the position 
by the CCP Party Congress in Beijing in July 2011, and remains 
in place today.22 His new office, and those of most of the CCP 
Party Committee, is in Xinchengqu; the impetus to complete the 
Hwanggumpyeong Island SEZ could hardly be more obvious to 
those who look at it on a daily basis.
The Problem of Floods
In the Yalu River estuary prone to flooding, the Chinese side 
appears concerned that the North Koreans have not and will 
not take physical steps to shore up and protect the presumed 
Chinese investment in any eventual physical plant. The fact that 
China went ahead with a public embrace of this idea in spite 
of open doubts about the viability of the investment, not to 
mention after so conclusively scotching a larger version of it 
a decade ago by jailing its foremost advocate Yang Bin, might 
indicate that the PRC was sufficiently nervous about assuring 
a stable succession in Pyongyang that they pushed it ahead 
anyway. In this somewhat “pell-mell and wait” scenario, China’s 
North Korea policy embraces the logic and long-term imperative 
of somewhat illogical policy decisions on the frontier, mixed 
with a few improvised and potentially harmful muddy cocktails.
While the public face put forward about the zones from Beijing’s 
media was a measured smile and the promotion of trade 
fairs, there were doubts being expressed by scholars like Tang 
Longwen. Writing in no less an outlet than Shijie Zhishi (World 
Knowledge), the magazine affiliated with the Chinese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, he expounded the dangers of flooding for 
China’s investment in the SEZ. Tang noted that in the absence 
of proper preparation, decades’ worth of construction 
achievements and huge capital investment can in a moment 
be turned into soap bubbles. Tang’s assessment is grounded 
in history, recalling Japanese work on flood control in the Yalu 
River delta in the 1930s and 40s, including the massive Huichon 
Dam, which continues to anchor energy production upstream. 
But rather than dwell on the shared sacrifices of the Korean 
War era, Tang noted that since Deng’s policies of opening 
and reform took hold in the northeast in the early 1980s, the 
country has again put great financial strength into constructing 
and extending protective dam projects [which have] made 
Dandong City’s degree of safety continually increase.” Praise 
for Deng frequently precedes a Chinese critique of the DPRK, 
and Tang does not disappoint: “But in this regard, North Korea 
has invested extremely little, and as a result, every time a flood 
comes, all suffer its harm.”
In the 2010 Yalu River flood hazard for example, due to the 
widespread rainstorm in northeastern China, the water 
level of the Yalu River quickly rose to its upper reaches, and 
located its lower reaches. North Korea’s Sinuiju and Wihwa 
Island encountered severe flooding, the likes of which 
comes once in 30 years.
In the event that upon the island various kinds of 
businesses and public facilities were constructed, if they 
suffered such bitter flooding, it would cause huge damage. 
From the significance of this it can be said that if these two 
islands become free trade zones, then of necessity floods 
must first be protected against. And managing the floods 
will require building huge flood-defensive dams, that is 
to say, will require huge capital and financial resources 
investment as a prerequisite. But these kinds of resources 
are not abundantly available, and the development value of 
these two small islands is not at all great, and if investment 
exceeds productive value, whether or not the project is 
worthwhile still needs to be demonstrated.
In addition, we are still able to try borrowing from the 
experience of North and South Korea’s Kaesong Industrial 
Park. It can be said that in the absence of China’s support, 
North Korea would find it hard to have the huge economic 
strength to develop the two islands, but without North 
Korea’s complete economic opening, the actual significance 
of the development of the two islands is not at all very great.
As a consequence, the key point is not whether or not the 
DPRK’s two islands are developed, but rather whether or 
not the DPRK is really prepared to open up.23
Having personally visited Dandong during the floods, and apart 
from the lack of Chinese support, I find it remarkable that North 
Korea plans to build extensively on the islands which were so 
badly flooded in 2010. Moreover, looking at the area on Google 
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Earth, it appears that the North Koreans have spent more 
resources building a huge fence around the new bridge over the 
Yalu than they have on flood control for the ostensible SEZ.
Details on the Hwanggumpyeong/Wihwa Zones
China has pumped about RMB 2.2 billion ($354 million) into just 
one supporting project, a new bridge to handle what is expected 
to be new and heavy traffic flows – which also helps out should 
China ever need to move into North Korea – with businesses that 
make both sides of the Yalu richer.
Both sides have nominally discussed and agreed to the 
Economic Zone Act. The documents and agreements in the act 
cover the basic economic zone development and economic 
zone management. There are also procedures for establishing, 
registering, and operating enterprises, as well as protecting 
economic activity (but it is unclear who or what they are 
protecting it from), encouraging preferential policies and 
outlining complaint and dispute resolution. The law covers basic 
economic zone investment related matters, and outlines even 
more detailed, specific requirements.
The preferred industries for the 16.6 square kilometer zones 
include industry garment processing, producing consumer 
electronics, modern and efficient agriculture, culture, creativity 
and even financial services. The Chinese side in particular hopes 
major banks will set up branch offices in the zone in order to 
transfer currencies and allow for foreign remittances of legitimate 
profits. China even hopes to employ 10-20,000 North Koreans.24
In June 2011 Jang Song-taek arrived in Sinuiju from Pyongyang 
for the opening ceremony at Hwanggumpyeong Island at the 
mouth of the Yalu River. But after the red carpet was rolled 
up, more work remained to do with respect to the particulars 
of investment law. A few declarations in North Korean media 
in early 2012 indicated that the DPRK was working on a more 
palatable legal framework for the Chinese businesses that 
would ostensibly set up on Hwanggumpyeong — perhaps with 
cheap North Korean workers. The DPRK also developed and 
publicized a new law on natural disasters which may have been 
related. But, by and large, the lack of movement by China in 
terms of constructing much of anything on the island tells the 
story. A major Sino-North Korean cultural and trade festival 
which was to have taken place in June 2012 was quietly backed 
up to October 2012.
However, even in glowing reviews of the SEZs in Sinuiju, there is 
much left to do. In a long December 3, 2012 article focusing on 
those SEZs, China Economic Weekly called them “an innovative 
model of international cooperation [that] still needs much work, 
thought and human talent.” The article went on to catalogue a 
laundry list of items that had yet to be resolved, including visa 
issues, banking regulations, and communications. It is further 
worth noting that North Korea’s lifting of the ban on foreign cell 
phones in Pyongyang was pointedly not extended into Sinuiju 
and surrounding areas, a virtual necessity if North Korea wants 
Chinese business partners to be functional in the zone. As 
with so many things, the grand gesture in the capital obscures 
recalcitrance toward and distrust of the periphery.
Visits to Dandong and Shenyang, along with conversations 
with experts in China, all confirm China’s searing desire to get 
economic activity geared up in the Liaoning-Korean frontier zone. 
The moves to set up SEZs in the Sinuiju area, it bears recalling, are 
not Kim Jong-un’s brainchild in the least. He has not associated 
himself with them in any way, either through juxtaposition in 
the state media or through on-site inspections. In Chinese trips 
to Pyongyang, the SEZs were conspicuously absent in public 
pronouncements, even after the big October 2012 trade fair in 
Dandong. Chinese media stories indicate that the silence on this 
matter was no indication that relevant problems had been solved 
by Jang Song-taek when he sojourned to the PRC in August 2012.
China’s goal is for moderate growth in the North Korean economy 
that allows for what China is trying to become, a “moderately 
prosperous society.” Meanwhile, Sinuiju remains caught up in 
North Korean economic and security discourse. Chinese hopes 
for reform in North Korea are not so much rooted in a desire for 
Kim Jong-un to start things, but for Kim Jong-un to merely follow 
through on positive initiatives which had begun in 2010, or, in 
some cases, 2002. Indeed, Chinese analysts have been trying to 
understand and use DPRK’s Joint Venture Law to create the basis 
for more Foreign Direct Investment.
After the Purge
In December 2013, against the backdrop of the image of Jang 
Song-taek stripped of his coveted Party membership and being 
marched away to the executioner, a voice from Dandong called 
for calm, stating that nothing was out of the ordinary. The opinion 
belonged to Lu Chao, a conservative voice on North Korean affairs 
based at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences in Shenyang, 
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who had been dispatched immediately to Dandong to deliver a 
message of calm resolve and stability to a Chinese public nervous 
about the goings-on in Pyongyang. As Lu explained to the mass 
foreign affairs tabloid Huanqiu Shibao:
In the two years since Kim Jong-un took office, continuous 
smooth progress has been made on a number of 
projects, including the development of two islands [i.e., 
Hwanggumpyeong and Wihwa], new bridge construction 
over the Yalu River, and Rason terminal expansion. 
While Jang played an important role in Sino-DPRK 
economic cooperation, including his key part in driving 
the Hwanggumpyeong agreement, the shared policies 
of China and the DPRK retain strong continuity. As of 
December 12, the general feeling in Dandong is that the 
Hwanggumpyeong project remains entirely unaffected (by 
Jang’s purge and execution).25
In other words, Jang had carried the ball of Chinese-North 
Korean economic cooperation forward a certain distance, and 
his achievements stood, even if the future appeared to be 
somewhat murky. The reluctance of the Chinese Communist 
Party – either itself or through its various proxies in the media 
or academia – to strike back at North Korea directly for its purge 
of Jang Song-taek, in a sense, is among the strongest testifiers 
to Beijing’s long-term pragmatism toward the DPRK. Although 
China had been attacked more or less directly in Jang’s indictment 
and a number of signals indicated the CCP’s displeasure with 
Jang’s removal and its methods, the SEZs would still be available 
as a vessel for bilateral cooperation, even if it were a tarnished 
symbol. As the DPRK moves to shift its old SEZ strategy into one 
more of its own devising, Chinese investors will have to watch 
and wonder if this time will be any different. North Korea’s new 
push for Economic Development Zones in the border region is 
being grudgingly accepted and adapted to by the local Chinese 
authorities, as was seen in the case of the Onsong zone just 
after Jang Song-taek’s death. But a smattering of tourism and 
a few agricultural sales to Chinese in their automobiles or small 
boats is no substitute for a high-tech zone, an international 
banking hub, or a huge seafood processing plant, let along light 
manufacturing of textiles. Chinese leaders, particularly in the 
provinces, are not pleased with the North Korean change, but 
they will surely be willing to open their wallets again and adjust 
infrastructural and investment plans to suit the DPRK’s more 
limited ambitions in the Sinuiju area.
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